Staffing a Trump II

Would the talent market supply what a potential administration wants?

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If the American people give Donald Trump a second term, who will work for that administration?

This is a familiar Washington parlor game. When there’s a new president, tongues wag about who will get which top department jobs and which White House staffers will be closest to the Oval Office.

But for a potential Trump II, it’s a different conversation.

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Generally, after a new president is elected, there are about 100,000 eager (often desperate) candidates for each important job. It’s a buyer’s market.

But with a Trump II, the buyer has unusual preferences. So we have to think about the sellers, too.

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Let’s start with the perspective of a Trump II—the talent buyer. Usually, a new president has a clear political ideology and a set of strongly held policy positions. That sends signals to the field about who is wanted. But as I’ve written, Mr. Trump doesn’t have a discernible approach to policy (apart from maybe immigration). For sure, he has a persona, an affect. But he doesn’t have an explicit philosophy of governing. He also changes his mind routinely. So, unlike most other administrations, buying policy talent is not the dominant theme of a Trump II vision board.

What is? Probably loyalty. Now, all new administrations like loyal candidates—potential hires who understand that the president is the boss and that the job of those in the administration is to promote and protect the president and advance his/her agenda. But Mr. Trump takes demands of loyalty to a new level. And since he seems to believe his first administration was undermined by hires who were insufficiently loyal, we should expect even greater demands of devotion.

This kind of loyalty-before-alignment approach isn’t just unusual; it has a meaningful influence on governing. For instance, a secretary of labor is generally picked because she and the president are simpatico on labor issues; a national security advisor is hired because she is committed to the president’s views on diplomacy, force, and so on. But the first time around, Mr. Trump hired some people for big positions even though they had little to no governing experience—so it seemed like policy alignment didn’t count for much. He also hired people with very different views on key matters. Later, he fired people (often ungraciously) because they, in fact, weren’t aligned.

For those of us who care about policy and governing, it was nearly inconceivable the way Mr. Trump suddenly and summarily trashed the policy- and personnel-prep work of his 2016 transition team. How in the world are you going to take office, we thought, without that material? You need to lay out what you want to accomplish and have people ready to execute, we thought.

But in hindsight his actions make sense. In a way. Mr. Trump just doesn’t think of people and policy like the typical governing leader. Indeed, this is one way to understand his denigration of Project 2025. Those who worked on it thought they were laying essential groundwork for his administration. Mr. Trump did not see that project as essential. In fact, he probably doesn’t even believe that type of transition work—slow, methodical preparation to govern—is really necessary.

What we can infer from all of the above is that, from the perspective of a second Trump team, program analysis, policy plans, and governing insights are fine, but loyalty to the boss is key.

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Things look different from the perspective of job candidates. Generally, the types of people who might be a cabinet official, an assistant secretary, an agency chief of staff, or a White House aide care a great deal about policy and governing. Typically, they have built their careers on believing certain things deeply and working in and around government to get them accomplished.

These people would be excited to work for an administration if they believed the president and those s/he hired cared about the same issues. But an administration job—quitting your current position, possibly relocating your family—would be far less enticing if you weren’t sure everyone was aligned or if you had reason to believe the boss might suddenly change  course.

Another concern relates to reputation. In a typical administration, those hired put the boss first and in return they are treated with respect, at least publicly. They might lose an internal battle. The president might override one of their decisions. They might even get let go if things aren’t working out. But the hire knows that, if she plays by the rules, she can expect fair, even charitable, treatment. That is not how Mr. Trump did business in his first term. But good people want to protect their personal and professional reputations. They’ve worked for decades to build a track record of dedicated service, good relationships, and successful outcomes. They don’t want to risk that. And because these folks often have families, communities, and future careers to think about, they would also prefer to avoid being investigated, arrested, indicted, disbarred, and/or jailed.  

Lastly, because of their own dignity, they probably want to be known and appreciated for more than loyalty to someone else.

So to put this crisply, there might well be a nontrivial mismatch between the supply of qualified talent and the personnel demands of Trump II.

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To think about how this might play out, it’s helpful to consider a few categories of potential hires.

First, as alluded to above, there are the experienced, policy-knowledgeable, reputation-guarding governing professionals. These folks make up the lion’s share of senior positions in most administrations. For the reasons listed above, many will not be interested in a job in Trump II. Remember, if Mr. Trump wins, he’s immediately a lame duck, unable to run for another term. Some individuals, knowing the risks of going into the administration, will prefer to delay their service to the nation for four years. Importantly, many folks in Mr. Trump’s orbit derisively refer to this group as members of the “deep state” or “swamp.” So in some cases there won’t be much sadness on the part of the new administration’s hiring team if they opt out.

Second, new administrations typically bring loyalists from the new president’s previous governing job. JFK brought some of his U.S. Senate staff, Carter brought folks from Georgia, George W. Bush from Texas. Biden had lots of people from his half century of service. Mr. Trump didn’t build his career in public service, so he doesn’t have that deep well of governing talent. Perhaps some from his previous administration will return. But will he want them? Will they want to return? If they do, will they be more effective than last time?

Third, junior, energetic, ambitious, but inexperienced individuals from the party apparatus and campaign will be an option. They won’t have much practical wisdom on governing or policy. But they might be very loyal. Could they be effective?

Fourth are highly successful leaders from other sectors—business, academia, the military. Most administrations hire some of these folks for cabinet positions and other senior posts. Mr. Trump seems to like such people. But after his first administration will such people want to work for him?

All in all, I have a hard time envisioning how a Trump II succeeds on personnel. Many able people will pull themselves out of the running, and Mr. Trump’s team will purposely exclude others. His lame-duck status won’t help the recruiting process. The administration will likely be able to hire junior and loyalty-promising staff but I question their ability to get much done. Governing is harder than agitating and cogitating.

I suspect some good, talented, highly experienced people—some from the Hill, some from think tanks, some from the states—would serve and find ways to accomplish some goals. But I anticipate those being the exceptions not the rule.